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1. INTRODUCTION
An honest man's daughter, after refusing the sexual advances of her
boyfriend and his friend, finds herself beaten bloody and hospitalized
with her jaw wired shut. Her father, outraged at the crime perpetrated
against his only child, pleads with her godmother's husband, a local crime
boss, to kill her attackers. The reply? "That I cannot do. You are being
carried away."' Instead, the order is to beat the boys as they had beaten
the girl.2
This familiar scene appears early in Mario Puzo's novel, The Godfa-
ther, and opens the Oscar-winning film of the same name.' The relevant
point is that, even when a Mafia boss is the judge, the punishment must
match the offense.
In 2008, the United States Supreme Court decided Kennedy v. Louisi-
ana,' in which the Court held that the death penalty was unconstitutional
as applied to a child rapist.' The Court so held because it found no na-
1. MARIO Puzo, THE GooAIrER 30-32 (1969). After the judge suspended the boys'
jail sentence, Bonasera sought Don Carleone's assistance to find justice for his daughter.
Id. at 30. When Don Carleone asks Bonasera his definition of justice, Bonasera responds,
"An eye for an eye." Id. at 32. Don Carleone, however, disagrees with Bonasera's ratio-
nale arguing that the punishment is too extreme for the crime because the boys did not
murder his daughter. Id.
2. See id. at 30-33, 66 (providing an order that restores justice rather than murderous
revenge). After being beaten by the two boys, Bonasera's daughter's suffered two black
eyes, a broken nose, and a shattered jaw. Id. at 30.
3. Id. at 29-33; THE GODFATIEIIR (Paramount Pictures 1972) (portraying the Ameri-
can legal system as ineffective at protecting immigrant families against crime). As the
opening scene of the movie, this exchange between a reputable businessman and the un-
derworld boss demonstrates for the audience the popularity of the mafia and its source of
strength. THE GODFATHER (Paramount Pictures 1972). The underworld is shown to be
attractive to first generation Italian immigrants who were clawing out an existence in their
new world. Id. The Godfather garners strength and respect among the Italian community
because he is willing to distribute justice for hire in exchange for the cooperation of legiti-
mate businessmen. Id.
4. 554 U.S. 407 (2008). Louisiana convicted a man of raping his eight-year-old step-
daughter and sentenced him to death. Id. at 412-13. The Louisiana Supreme Court af-
firmed the sentence, finding that United States Supreme Court precedent did not preclude
the execution of child-rapists. Id. at 417-18. Louisiana considered children to be a class of
people deserving special protection which justified the execution of sexual predators who
violate young boys and girls. Id. at 418.
5. Id. at 413. When police arrived at the home of the raped child, they found the
young girl swaddled in a bloody blanket on her bed and bleeding profusely from her va-
gina. Id. The police were unable to obtain a reliable DNA sample because the petitioner
had wiped clean the girl's pubic area. See id. The pediatric forensic expert who inspected
the girl after the sexual assault stated that the injuries she sustained were the worst he had
ever encountered. Id. at 414.
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tional consensus in favor of the death penalty for such a crime, and be-
cause it found that the death penalty was disproportionate to the crime.6
The Court's decision has sparked debate among scholars and commen-
tators-even President Obama-about whether the Court reached the
right decision and whether the Court appropriately justified its decision.
The debate over the Court's findings about national consensus and pro-
portionality demonstrates that the foundations of law and justice are at
odds with many modern Americans' notions of morality and the death
penalty.
In this Article, I respond to these critics of the Kennedy decision, and
argue the Court's holding was correct. The Court's "national consensus"
justification may have been inaccurate, especially considering that at the
time of the decision, three states had recently enacted laws providing for
the death penalty in child rape cases.' Even so, the decision reinforced
and reinvigorated the foundations of American criminal jurisprudence
because it recognized the Eighth Amendment's pursuit of proportionality
in criminal punishment.'
This Article examines the foundations of law and justice in American
jurisprudence to illuminate the Court's decision in Kennedy. Drawing on
the philosophy of retributivists, primarily Immanuel Kant, this Article
embraces the principle that justice is paramount, and that matching pun-
ishment to crime furthers the interests of justice.
This Article, like the Kennedy case, is limited to the facts of that case.9
Furthermore, the discussion proceeds within a framework of several pre-
sumptions: that the rape at issue is the first rape conviction for the perpe-
trator, that the crime was a one-time event, that the rapist did not have a
potentially deadly communicable disease (such as HIV), and that the in-
juries inflicted, though horrific, were limited to the rape itself.
The Article opens with a survey of Eighth Amendment death penalty
jurisprudence, particularly as applied to rape. Then, it briefly examines
retributivist philosophy with regard to crime and punishment, focusing on
Immanuel Kant's articulation. Finally, the Article demonstrates how the
6. Id. at 420-34 (explaining that there are limits to when the death penalty can be
imposed). The Louisiana statute in question included nonconsensual intercourse with a
minor under the age of twelve in its definition of aggravated rape. Id. at 416-17, 423.
Aggravated rape was normally punishable by life in prison subject to hard labor and with-
out the possibility of parole. Id. at 416-17. However, if the victim of the aggravated as-
sault was under twelve-years-old, the District Attorney could seek the death penalty for
the rapist. Id. at 416.
7. Id. at 423-25 (alluding to a possible trend toward allowing the death penalty in
child rape cases in Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas).
8. Id. at 435.
9. See Part III of this Article for a detailed description of the facts in Kennedy.
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Court's decision in Kennedy was consistent with that retributivist
philosophy.
II. EIGHTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND RAPE
"Described as 'confused,' 'anarchic,' 'vast,' and 'a minefield through
which . . . perplexed legislators tread at their peril,' the Supreme Court's
death penalty jurisprudence demonstrates a notorious lack of clarity and
frustrates state legislatures that seek to devise constitutionally valid capi-
tal punishment laws.""o The Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, adopted in 1791, states: "[e]xcessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted."" However, in Weems v. United States,1 2 the Court acknowl-
edged that "[w]hat constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment has not
been exactly decided."" Weems was a government official, convicted of
falsifying documents and defrauding the government.14 He was sen-
tenced to fifteen years of hard labor while confined in heavy chains.15
The Court vacated his sentence and ordered the proceedings against him
dismissed.16 In its decision, the Court noted "that punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense"" and cautioned
that the meaning of "cruel and unusual" cannot be confined to what the
framers may have meant when the Bill of Rights was drafted.18 "The
clause of the Constitution . . . is not fastened to the obsolete, but may
acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane
justice.""
More than forty years later, in Trop v. Dulles,20 the Supreme Court
expounded on the Weems Court's insight that interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment must take into account public opinion and societal
interests.2 ' The Court ruled that it would look to "the evolving standards
10. Harvard Law Review Association, Eighth Amendment-Death Penalty-Weigh-
ing of Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, 120 HAizv. L. Rrv. 144, 144 (2006) (footnotes
omitted) (analyzing the Supreme Court's decision in Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006),
which reinforced precedent requiring death penalty regimes to narrow "the class of offend-
ers and the admission of mitigating evidence").
11. U.S. CONs-r. amend. VIII.
12. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
13. Id. at 368.
14. Id. at 357.
15. Id. at 357, 381.
16. Id. at 382.
17. Weems, 217 U.S. at 367.
18. Id. at 378.
19. Id. at 371 (citation omitted).
20. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
21. Id. 100-01.
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of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" when deciding
whether punishment would be considered "cruel and unusual." 2 2 In
Trop, a soldier was stripped of his U.S. citizenship as punishment for de-
serting during World War 11.23 The Court held that the punishment was
disproportionate to his crime, excessive in nature, and thus unconstitu-
tional under the Eighth Amendment.2 4 While neither Weems nor Trop
were death penalty cases, both are part of the foundation of death pen-
alty challenges under the "cruel and unusual" punishment clause of the
Eighth Amendment.
In 1972, a divided Court struck down the death penalty under the
"cruel and unusual" punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment and
halted all executions in the thirty-nine states that had capital statutes.25
The landmark case Furman v. Georgia2 6 drew the Court's attention to
three African-American men on death row: William Henry Furman was
convicted in Georgia for murder;27 Lucious Jackson was convicted in
Georgia for rape;28 and Elmer Branch was convicted in Texas for rape.2 9
The juries in each of these three cases were not statutorily required to
impose the death penalty, nor were they instructed to consider any aggra-
vating or mitigating factors."o The decision to impose death was in the
jury's sole and unfettered discretion."
Implementing the death penalty under such jury discretion was consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's holding in McGautha v. California,3 2 just a
year before Furman, that jury guidelines for imposition of the death pen-
alty were unnecessary.33 Despite the obvious consistency in jury discre-
tion, the Furman Court reversed course. The 5-4 decision, expressed in
nine separate opinions, was that, because of the way capital punishment
laws were written and administered, capital punishment was cruel and
unusual, thus violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 3 4 One
22. Id. at 101.
23. Id. at 88.
24. Id. at 101-02.
25. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
26. Id.
27. See id. at 294-95 (Brennan, J., concurring).
28. See id. at 252 (Douglas, J., concurring).
29. See id. at 253.
30. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 314 (Stewart, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring).
32. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). The Court held, "[i]n light of history, experience, and the
limitations of human knowledge in establishing definitive standards, it is impossible to say
that leaving to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death
in capital cases violates any provision of the Constitution." Id. at 183.
33. See id.
34. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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of the concerns the Court expressed was that the death penalty was being
imposed randomly in a manner that sent poor or nonwhite offenders to
death row more often than affluent or White offenders.35 The Court de-
termined that unlimited jury discretion was the primary cause of the dis-
parity. Reconciling the five opinions forming the majority, the Furman
Court declared that capital punishment violates the Eighth Amendment
if it is: (1) too severe for the crime; (2) imposed arbitrarily-for example,
by juries without guidelines, where some offenders get the punishment
and others do not; (3) offensive to society's sense of justice; or, (4) less
effective than an alternative penalty.36 The Court's decision in Furman
effectively ended capital punishment as it existed under many state stat-
utes at the time.
In light of Furman, many state legislatures redrafted their capital pun-
ishment statutes. Georgia redrafted its statutes in a manner that pro-
vided for a bifurcated trial, required the jury to find at least one
aggravating circumstance and consider any mitigating circumstances, and
provided for an expedited review of proportionality by the state Supreme
Court. 38 The constitutionality of this newly structured death penalty stat-
ute was presented to the Supreme Court in the matter of Gregg v. Geor-
gia3 1 just a few years after Furman.4 0
Georgia took the position that these safeguards ensured courts did not
impose the death penalty arbitrarily and did not offend the community's
sense of justice because juries were not given unfettered discretion and
were instructed about what they can and must consider before imposing
death as the penalty for the crime at issue.4 1 Further, the requirement of
judicial review for all death penalty cases ensured the penalty would be
reviewed for proportionality to determine whether the penalty was too
severe for the crime and whether there was a more effective penalty
35. Id. at 250-52.
36. See generally id.
37. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977) ("Furman then invalidated most of the
capital punishment statutes in this country, including the rape statutes, because, among
other reasons, of the manner in which the death penalty was imposed and utilized under
those laws.").
38. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 153 (1976) (holding that implementation of the
death penalty for the crime of murder did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments on every occasion). In Gregg, the criminal defendant was charged with armed rob-
bery and murder. Id. at 158. The jury found Gregg guilty of killing and robbing two men
while hitchhiking in Florida. Id. at 159. The trial was submitted to the jury in two stages:
the guilt stage and the penalty stage. Id. at 160.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 153-54 (revisiting the scheme for imposition of the death sentence).
41. Id. at 196-98.
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available to punish the offender.4 2 The Supreme Court agreed and ap-
proved Georgia's capital punishment sentencing structure. 4 3
At the time the Court reviewed Gregg, it also reviewed the capital pun-
ishment statutes of four other states: Florida, Texas, Louisiana, and North
Carolina." Florida's and Texas' death penalty statutes survived the
Court's scrutiny,4 5 but Louisiana's and North Carolina's did not, prima-
rily because their statutes made the death penalty mandatory in certain
instances, taking away discretion from the jury altogether.4 6
While the Court did not provide specific criteria for the states to sat-
isfy, we can extract two identifiable standards from these decisions. First,
the statutory scheme must provide objective criteria to direct and limit
the sentencing discretion of the judge or jury, and the sentence must be
reviewed by a higher court to ensure objectivity. 47 Second, the defen-
dant's character and record must be considered before imposing a sen-
tence of death.48 Just a few short years after the Court effectively ended
it, the death penalty made its comeback into the U.S. criminal justice sys-
tem, but not without further Court review and discussion about its appro-
priateness under the Eighth Amendment.
42. See id. at 198-99.
43. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207.
44. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 284-85 (1976) (considering whether North Caro-
lina's statute requiring the death penalty for individuals convicted of first-degree murder
violates a defendant's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights); Roberts v. Louisiana,
428 U.S. 325, 328 (1976) (assessing the constitutionality of the Louisiana law requiring the
death penalty in cases of first-degree murder, even where the jury is able to consider a
lesser charge).
45. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 242; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 262.
46. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286-87, 299 (1976) (reviewing the
North Carolina statute which sentenced an unwilling accomplice to death); Roberts, 428
U.S. at 329, 334 (assessing the constitutionality of Louisiana's mandatory imposition of the
death penalty when defendant is convicted of first degree murder).
47. Compare Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-99 (requiring Georgia juries to consider various
factors in the punishment phase and discussing the automatic appeal process for defend-
ants sentenced to death), and Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 250-51 (explaining Florida trial judges
are to weigh eight aggravating factors against seven mitigating factors before determining
whether a sentence of death should be imposed, followed by an automatic appeal), and
Jurek, 428 U.S. at 271-72 (stating that a system that did not allow juries to consider miti-
gating factors when considering the death penalty was unacceptable), with Woodson, 428
U.S. at 286-87, 299, 301 (stating North Carolina's mandatory death penalty for murder
convictions was inconsistent with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments), and Roberts,
428 U.S. at 329, 334-36 (determining Louisiana's mandatory death penalty for first-degree
murder convictions was unconstitutional).
48. Compare Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-99, and Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 250-51, and Jurek,
428 U.S. at 271-72, with Woodson, 428 U.S. at 286-87, 299, 301, and Roberts, 428 U.S. at
329, 334-36.
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In 1977, five years after Furman was decided, the Court heard Anthony
Coker's case, in which he received the death penalty for rape, kidnap-
ping, and aggravated assault.4 9 He committed these offenses after escap-
ing from a Georgia prison where he was serving a life sentence for
murder, rape, kidnapping, and aggravated assault.5 o Despite the aggra-
vating circumstances of Coker's prior criminal history, and the fact that
he committed the offenses at issue while an escapee from the Georgia
prison system, the Court held that capital punishment was grossly dispro-
portionate to the crime of rape.5 1
Moreover, the Court ruled cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment included punishment that was excessive in relation to
the crime committed. 52 The Court set forth a two prong test to determine
excessiveness.53 A "punishment is 'excessive' and unconstitutional if it
(1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment
and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition
of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of
the crime." 54 The Court further declared that objective factors should be
the primary influence on Eighth Amendment death penalty judgments.5 5
Objective factors are those measurable factors that are not based on the
subjective opinions of individual Justices, but instead include "the public
attitudes concerning a particular sentence[-]history and precedent, legis-
lative attitudes, and the response of juries reflected in their sentencing
decisions. "56 The Court found that capital punishment for the crime of
rape could contribute to the goals of a retributive system," but it was
grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime considering objec-
tive factors like public attitudes-thus it failed to pass the second prong
of the test set forth by the Court."
49. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that the death penalty for rape was
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment).
50. Id.
51. See generally id.
52. Id. at 591-92.
53. Id. at 592.
54. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (emphasis added).
55. Id. (rejecting the notion that the subjective views of judges should be the main
standard for evaluating Eight Amendment judgments).
56. Id.
57. See id. at 597-98 (agreeing that the crime of rape "is without doubt deserving of
serious punishment").
58. See id. at 593-97 (identifying the lack of societal consensus in favor of allowing the
death penalty in rape cases, based on a majority of juries refusing to impose the death
penalty in rape cases and a majority of state legislatures failing to provide for such a
penalty).
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In its analysis of the objective factors related to the second prong, the
Court reviewed the history of rape statutes and inferred that both public
and legislative attitudes tended to indicate that the death penalty for rape
of an adult woman was not considered an acceptable punishment.59 As
the Court stated, "At no time in the last 50 years have a majority of the
States authorized death as a punishment for rape."6 0 The Coker Court
stated:
Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms
of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public,
it does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified
taking of human life. Although it may be accompanied by another
crime, rape by definition does not include the death of or even the
serious injury to another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no
more than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the murderer;
for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is
not over and normally is not beyond repair.6 1
Between 1964 and 2003, no defendant was executed in a non-homicide
case, even where a statute would have allowed it.6 2 This reluctance of
society to carry out the death penalty for non-homicide crimes would ap-
pear to indicate that contemporary society finds death an unacceptable
punishment for those crimes. However, the Supreme Court's death pen-
59. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596-98 (1977) (explaining the process by which
the Court arrived at its decision). At the time of the Court's decision, Georgia had sen-
tenced five rapists to death since the year 1973, leaving the harshest punishment for the
most extreme cases. Id. at 596-97. Even though juries imposed death penalties for rape in
those cases, the Court concluded that in the vast majority of instances, juries did not rec-
ommend capital punishment. Id. at 597. The legislative aversion to capital punishment for
rape served as further confirmation to the Court that the death penalty is simply too harsh
of a punishment for rape. Id.
60. Id. at 593. By the mid-1920s, capital punishment for rape was authorized by fed-
eral law as well as in eighteen states and the District of Columbia. Id. By 1971, just before
Furman, federal law still sanctioned death sentences for rape while the number of states
that did so decreased to sixteen. Coker, 433 U.S. at 593. After Furman invalidated most
capital punishment statutes, a majority of states enacted their own death penalty laws for
certain crimes only. Id. at 593-94; see, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per
curiam).
61. Coker, 433 U.S. at 598.
62. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, No. 07-343, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER
(April 16, 2008), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/kennedy-v-louisiana-no-0 7-343 (provid-
ing statistics, reports, and newsletters about past and current uses of the death penalty).
The federal government has its own laws on the death penalty, separate from the individ-
ual states. Part II: History of the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMAIiON CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/part-ii-history-death-penalty (last visited Oct. 22, 2010)
(discussing the federal death penalty).
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alty jurisprudence has not only concentrated on what crimes are death-
eligible, but which offenders are eligible for capital punishment.
In 1982, the Supreme Court held in Enmund v. Florida63 that, in apply-
ing the death penalty, the "punishment must be tailored to [the] personal
responsibility and moral guilt" of the defendant. 64 Earl Enmund partici-
pated in a robbery that resulted in the death of Eunice and Thomas Ker-
sey. 65 Enmund did not pull the trigger, or even carry a weapon during
the robbery attempt; he waited in the getaway car while his two accom-
plices robbed, and then shot, the two victims. 66 The Court held that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits executing a defendant who "aids and abets
a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others but who
does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or
that lethal force will be employed." 67 The Enmund Court noted, "It is
fundamental that 'causing harm intentionally must be punished more se-
verely than causing the same harm unintentionally."' 68 There is no more
63. 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (involving a felony murder charge resulting from a botched
robbery attempt in which the defendant, Enmund, drove the car after his accomplices shot
and killed an elderly couple).
64. Id. at 801 (finding the imbalance between punishment and crime violates the Eight
Amendment); see also James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court
and Capital Punishment, 1963-2006, 107 Cot-um. L. Riv. 1, 43-44 (2007) (highlighting the
emphasis placed on intent by the Supreme Court in Enmund).
65. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 784 (illustrating the scene of the killings where Eunice Ker-
sey tried to defend her husband, who was being threatened at gunpoint, by shooting at
Enmund's two accomplices who then fatally shot both Eunice and Thomas Kersey).
66. Id. at 784, 786 (discussing Enmund's limited involvement in the robbery and the
treatment given to the minimal evidence by the Florida Supreme Court in upholding the
first-degree murder conviction under the felony-murder rule).
67. Id. at 797.
For purposes of imposing the death penalty, Enmund's criminal culpability must be
limited to his participation in the robbery, and his punishment must be tailored to his
personal responsibility and moral guilt. Putting Enmund to death to avenge two kill-
ings that he did not commit and had no intention of committing or causing does not
measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring that the criminal gets his just
deserts.
Id. at 801.
68. Id. at 798 (quoting H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and the Elimination of Responsibility,
in PUNISHMENT AN) RESPONSIBILrry: ESSAYS IN THE PiniiosoPiY OF LAW 158, 162
(1968)). The Supreme Court considered Florida's application of the felony murder rule to
be fundamentally in error when Enmund's culpability was so clearly different from the
other defendants. Id. Additionally, the Court looked at the likelihood that a killing would
occur during the course of a robbery in examining the proportionality of punishment to
blame in Enmund's case. Id. at 799. Robbery statistics and national crime data both indi-
cated that less than one percent of robberies were likely to involve a homicide. Id. at
799-800. Not only does this small chance of a murder occurring further support Enmund's
showing of lesser culpability for the murders, but it also illustrates the futility of applying a
felony-murder punishment in an attempt to deter robberies. Id. at 798-99.
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severe punishment than execution, so in basing its opinion on this princi-
ple, the Enmund Court established that the death penalty cannot be im-
posed on someone who did not intend to kill.69 Five years later, in
another felony murder case, the Court clarified that the culpability re-
quirement for imposing the death penalty can be satisfied by the defen-
dant's "major participation in the felony," and his or her "reckless
indifference to human life."7 o
In Stanford v. Kentucky," the Supreme Court held it was constitution-
ally acceptable to execute defendants who committed their offenses when
they were juveniles because there was not a national consensus against
the practice.72 The Court looked to the actions of state legislatures and
noted that twenty-two of the thirty-seven death penalty states permitted
the death penalty for sixteen-year-old offenders and that twenty-five of
the thirty-seven permitted it for seventeen-year-old offenders.7 3 The
Court decided these numbers failed to constitute a national consensus
sufficient to label imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders "cruel
and unusual."7 4
69. Id. at 797.
70. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (finding that the Arizona Supreme
Court incorrectly applied the ruling of Edmund v. Florida when it upheld the death penalty
for two accomplices to murder). Petitioners Ricky and Raymond Tison helped devise and
execute a plan to break their father (Gary Tison) and his cellmate (Randy Greenwalt),
both convicted murderers, out of an Arizona jail. Id. at 139. After smuggling guns into the
prison the Petitioners, along with their father, Greenwalt, and another brother flagged
down a family desiring to steal their car. Id. at 139-40. After driving the family of four,
including a two-year-old child, into the desert the testimony showed that Petitioners' father
and Greenwalt shot all four captives. Id. at 140-41. In a joint trial for crimes connected to
the prison break and police shootout, Petitioners and Greenwalt were found guilty. Id. at
141. Each man was tried independent of the others for the murders under the Arizona
felony-murder statute, which mandates that a murder that occurs during the commission of
a robbery or kidnapping is a capital offense. Id. The Court remanded the case finding that
the Arizona Supreme Court's acceptance of foreseeability of harm as intent to kill was
erroneous under Edmund. Id. at 150.
71. 492 U.S. 361 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
72. Id. at 380 (holding the Eighth Amendment is not violated by imposing the death
penalty on defendants aged sixteen and seventeen because there is no discernible historical
or modern societal consensus against such a punishment), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
73. Id. at 370. The method by which the defense argued against the death sentence
was by stating that it went against the "'evolving standards of decency that mark the pro-
gress of a maturing society."' Id. at 379 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)
(emphasis in original)).
74. Id. at 370-71.
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However, the Supreme Court again changed course in 2005 with Roper
v. Simmons. In Roper, the Supreme Court determined that "evolving
standards of decency" prohibit the execution of defendants who commit-
ted their crimes while they were under age eighteen.7 6 The Court re-
ported there were thirty states that exclude the death penalty for
individuals under age eighteen; of those thirty, twelve completely rejected
it, and eighteen kept the juvenile death penalty, but excluded juveniles
through "express provision or judicial interpretation."7 7 Further, in the
sixteen years since Stanford, only six states had executed defendants on
the basis of crimes committed as juveniles, and in the ten years prior to
Roper, only three had done so.7 8 Additionally, of the states that permit-
ted the death penalty for juveniles when the Court decided Stanford, five
had since abandoned it by legislative action or judicial decision.7 9 The
Court also looked at international treatment of the death penalty for
juveniles and noted the United States was the only nation that continued
to officially sanction death sentences for juvenile offenders.80 A similar
75. See 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (considering whether individuals convicted of capital
crimes under the age of eighteen may be sentenced to death). Christopher Simmons was
seventeen years old when he murdered Shirley Crook. Id. at 556. Simmons and another
teenager broke into Crook's home, tied her up, and drove her in her own vehicle to a state
park. Id. With her head covered in a towel, her hands and feet bound with electrical wire,
and her face wrapped in duct tape, the young men threw her over the bridge, drowning
her. Id. at 556-57. After bragging to friends about the killing, Missouri police arrested
Simmons and he was charged with burglary, stealing, kidnapping, and first degree murder.
Id. at 557. Simmons' age put him outside the range to be tried as a juvenile, so he was tried
as an adult and sentenced to death. Id. at 557-58. The Missouri Supreme Court set aside
the sentence, and the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed. Id. at 559-60.
76. See id. at 563, 567-68 (examining previous courts' inquiries into the changing opin-
ions of the general populace regarding the use of the death penalty in specific instances
and holding that societal consensus weighed against imposing the death penalty on
juveniles).
77. Id. at 564.
78. Id. at 564-65.
79. Roper, 543 U.S. at 565.
80. Id. at 575 (examining international perspective on the death penalty for instruc-
tion on interpretation of the Eighth Amendment). The Court noted that Article 37 of the
United Nations Convention on the Right of the Child expressly prohibited the death pen-
alty for defendants under eighteen. Id. at 576. At the time of this hearing, the United
States and Somalia were the only two countries who had not ratified Article 37. Id. The
Court further noted that, besides the United States, only seven countries-Pakistan, Iran,
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, China, and the Democratic Republic of Congo-had car-
ried out juvenile executions since 1990. Id. at 577. Special attention was given to the
United Kingdom because of the historic ties it holds with the United States and the origin
of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 578. The Court emphasized the fact that the United
Kingdom abolished the death penalty before any international covenants addressed the
issue. Id. In fact, the United Kingdom had acknowledged the problem with the juvenile
death penalty as early as 1930. Id.
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change in course occurred in cases of capital punishment for the mentally
retarded.
In 1989, the same year as Stanford v. Kentucky," the Supreme Court
heard the case of Penry v. Lynaugh.8 2 The Court determined that impos-
ing the death penalty on mentally retarded defendants did not violate the
Eighth Amendment." The Court again turned to legislative action and
pointed out that only two states had enacted laws banning the imposition
of the death penalty on mentally retarded persons and that "the two state
statutes prohibiting execution of the mentally retarded, even when added
to the 14 states that have rejected capital punishment completely, do not
provide sufficient evidence at present of a national consensus." 8 4
However, a decade later, in Atkins v. Virginia," the Supreme Court
abrogated Penry and determined that "evolving standards of decency"
had made executing the mentally retarded unconstitutional.86 The Atkins
Court noted that eighteen states and the federal government already
banned the practice of executing the mentally retarded." The Court also
explained that even in states that permit the execution of the mentally
retarded, such executions were rarely carried out." Thus, the Court
deemed another application of the death penalty unconstitutional after a
review of society's evolving standards of decency."
In summary, the landmark cases of Furman9 0 and Gregg" created two
basic rules for capital sentencing regimes; as long as states abided by
these directives, their capital systems operate in a constitutionally sound
manner.9 2 First, a death penalty system must "rationally narrow the class
of death-eligible defendants"; second, it must "permit a jury to render a
reasoned, individualized sentencing determination based on a death-eligi-
ble defendant's record, personal characteristics, and the circumstances of
his crime."" Additionally, after consulting the nation's evolving stan-
81. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
82. 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
83. Id. at 335.
84. Id. at 334.
85. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (abrogating the Penry Court's holding that execution of juve-
nile offenders does not violate the Eighth Amendment).
86. Id. at 321.
87. See id. at 314-15.
88. Id. at 316.
89. See id. at 312, 321.
90. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
91. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding Georgia's scheme for the impo-
sition of the death penalty).
92. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173-74 (2006) (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 238 and
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153).
93. Id.
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dards of decency, the Court has chosen to allow capital punishment only
for the most blameworthy defendants-the mentally ill, 94 the mentally
retarded,95 and those offenders who were under age eighteen at the time
of the offense 9 6 are not eligible for capital punishment. The Court has
condoned the death penalty for the killer, or the felony accomplice who
attempts to kill, intends to kill, or displays a reckless indifference to
human life.97 The Court has expressly prohibited the crime of rape from
the capital sentencing landscape.98
However, some states are passing laws that challenge the Supreme
Court's death penalty jurisprudence and will likely test the nation's evolv-
ing standards of decency. In 1995, Louisiana became the first state to
enact legislation that provided for imposition of the death penalty for the
rape of a child under the age of twelve." Since then, Florida, Montana,
Georgia, South Carolina, Oklahoma, and Texas have followed.1" On the
other hand, California, Mississippi, Maryland, and Virginia have all con-
sidered bills designed to apply the death penalty to people who commit
sex crimes against children but declined to enact such legislation.o Fur-
thermore, at the time of the Kennedy case, only two people in the United
94. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986).
95. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
96. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
97. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (clarifying the intent to kill requirement
established in Edmund).
98. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) ("We have concluded that a sentence
of death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is
therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment.").
99. See LA. Riv. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(D)(2) (West 2007).
100. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(2)(a) (West 2007) (Governor Jeb Bush suspended
all executions on December 15, 2006 after a botched execution required a second injection
of the lethal chemicals); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503(3)(c)(i) (West 2007) (enacted in
1997, allows for the death penalty in cases where the defendant has been convicted for the
second time of rape involving serious bodily injury); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1 (West 2007)
(amended in 1999 to allow for the death penalty when the victim of the rape is under the
age of ten); S.C. CoDE. ANN. § 16-3-655(c)(1) (West 2007) (passed in 2006, allows for the
death penalty in cases where the defendant is convicted for a second time of the rape of a
child under the age of eleven); TEix. PENAL CoDE ANN. § 12.42(c)(3) (West 2007) (passed
by the Legislature and signed by the Governor in 2007); see also Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35,
63 (2008) (stipulating that lethal injection does not violate the Eighth Amendment and that
the Supreme Court defers to state legislatures in determining what constitutes humane
punishment).
101. See Assem. B. 35, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (bill died pursuant to Article
IV of the state constitution); S.B. 271, 1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 1998) (bill not carried
over after session adjournment); H.B. 543, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 1997) (bill died in
committee); S.B. 127, 1996 Leg., 410th Sess. (Md. 1996) (imposing the maximum penalty of
life without possibility of parole on those convicted of certain child sexual offenses and
kidnapping).
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States had been sentenced to death for the crime of rape, both in Louisi-
ana: Patrick Kennedy and Richard Davis.1 0 2
III. KENNEDY V. LOUISIANA
The facts in Kennedy were and are troubling. Patrick Kennedy, who
was 43-years-old at the time his case went to the Supreme Court, is a
Black man with an eighth grade education and an IQ of 70.103 On March
2, 1998, Mr. Kennedy called 911 to report the rape of his eight-year-old
stepdaughter." The girl told police, medical staff, investigators, and psy-
chologists, "that two teenage boys ... had dragged her into the yard from
the garage and forcibly raped her."' She provided a specific account of
the rape during a three-hour interview conducted by a social worker and
psychologist.' 06 She described the clothing the teenagers wore, the bike
belonging to one of the rapists, and the young men's body types.1 0 7
Within days of the attack, police officers located a bike and a shirt match-
ing the description the victim gave.os After locating the owner of the
items, police decided that the teenager was not a viable suspect because
the bike's tires were flat, rendering the bike inoperable, and the boy was
more heavy-set than muscular, as the eight-year-old victim had described
him.1 09 The young man even lied about his whereabouts on the day of
the rape and never provided the police with an alibi. 10 Nevertheless,
police turned their attention to Mr. Kennedy, the easiest target for their
investigation."'
Mr. Kennedy's wife told police that she could not imagine her husband
abusing or raping her daughter.' 12 Mrs. Kennedy maintained her belief
in her daughter's account: two teenage boys dragged her into the yard
and raped her." 3 In mid-March 1998, Mr. Kennedy was arrested and
102. Associated Press, Supreme Court Weighs Death Penalty for Child Rapists,
FoxNiws.com (April 15, 2008), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,351351,00.html
(portraying the mixed emotions felt by society in cases involving child rape).
103. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008)
(No. 07-343), 2007 WL 2688267 at *4.
104. Id.
105. Id. at *4-5
106. Id. at *5.
107. Id.
108. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008)
(No. 07-343), 2007 WL 2688267 at *5.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See id. at *6.
113. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008)
(No. 07-343), 2007 WL 2688267 at *6.
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charged with raping his stepdaughter.' 1 4 Yet, both the girl and her
mother stood by his side. 15 On April 7, 1998, Child Protection Services
(CPS) removed the girl from her mother's care; its reasoning was that
"[M]rs. Kennedy believes the story that her daughter tells her about two
strangers dragging her from the garage and raping her on the side of their
house."" 6 CPS workers felt that they "needed to 'protect[] [the victim]
from these negative influences' from her mother and described 'treat-
ment' as being necessary because: 'allegations of sexual abuse by step-
father; mother is denying abuse; child has alleged other perpetrators,
however evidence points to step-father."" 1" The police found no DNA
evidence at the scene, on the girl's clothes, or on her person to indicate
that Mr. Kennedy was the perpetrator."' Instead, police were relying on
circumstantial evidence, perceived inconsistencies in the girl's version of
events, and Mr. Kennedy's actions that did not comport with their expec-
tations of what a person in a similar situation would do-a standard he
could not possibly meet given his education and level of intelligence.1 19
CPS advised Mrs. Kennedy they would return her daughter only when
Mrs. Kennedy could "'be objective concerning evidence' of the rape." 20
The CPS workers encouraged Mrs. Kennedy to tell her daughter that she
believed Mr. Kennedy committed the rape.' 2 1 Faced with a prolonged,
and perhaps permanent, separation from her daughter, who was already
undergoing an extraordinarily traumatic period in her life, Mrs. Kennedy
told her daughter that she suspected Mr. Kennedy was the man who had
raped her.'2 2 She also encouraged the girl to change her account of the
rape, saying it would be "okay" to tell people Mr. Kennedy raped her.12 3
Two and a half months later, CPS returned the young girl to her mother
and required both to attend joint counseling supervised by CPS and pros-
ecutors in Mr. Kennedy's case.' 2 4 Still, the victim did not change her
story. 1 2 5 Twenty months after the rape, in December 1999, the young girl
finally gave into the pressure, changed her story, and told the state's in-
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008)
(No. 07-343), 2007 WL 2688267 at *7.
119. Id. at *5-7, *4.
120. Id. at *6.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008)
(No. 07-343), 2007 WL 2688267 at *6.
124. Id.
125. See id.
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vestigators that Mr. Kennedy was the one who raped her.1 2 6 She was
unable, however, to give specifics, only that it happened in her bed in the
early morning and that she fainted soon after the rape.12 7
Jury selection in Mr. Kennedy's trial began on August 8, 2003, and con-
tinued from August 11 through August 15.128 "The trial court dismissed
forty-four potential jurors because 'they would not consider capital pun-
ishment either generally or for an offense of aggravated rape.' "129 How-
ever, the trial commenced on August 15 once the twelve-member jury
was impaneled.13 0 The jury reached a unanimous verdict on August 25,
2003, finding Mr. Kennedy guilty of aggravated rape of a child under the
age of 12.131 On May 22, 2007, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed
Kennedy's death sentence, rendered by the jury in August 2003 under the
authority provided by Louisiana's capital child rape statutes. 1 3 2
The United States Supreme Court overturned Patrick Kennedy's death
sentence as unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.13 3 The
Court held that the death penalty is inappropriate for the crime of child
rape because the national consensus is against imposing the death penalty
126. See id.
127. Id. at *7.
128. Louisiana v. Kennedy, 957 So. 2d 757, 760 (La. 2007), rev'd 554 U.S. 407 (2008)
(recounting the case history leading up to the Louisiana Supreme Court's holding). By the
time of the trial, more than five years had passed since the rape occurred and nine had
passed by the time the case reached the Louisiana Supreme Court. Id. Although the Loui-
siana Supreme Court ultimately affirmed Kennedy's death sentence, it did agree with the
defendant that the trial court should have disallowed an adult witness from testifying under
a "lustful disposition exception" that she was also raped by the defendant sixteen years
before the current incident. Id. at 760 n.3. In regard to the victim's statements accusing
Kennedy as her rapist, a videotaped interview was admitted into trial in place of face-to-
face confrontation. Id. at 772. The Sixth Amendment protects a defendant's right to con-
front his accuser but, as the Court in Kennedy determined, "it is not an absolute right." Id.
Louisiana is not alone in its adoption of special procedures for children testifying in cases
of abuse and requires any such testimony to meet strict statutory requirements. Id. at
773-74.
129. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008)
(No. 07-343), 2007 WL 2688267 at *7.
130. Compare Louisiana v. Kennedy, 957 So. 2d 757, 760 (La. 2007), rev'd 554 U.S.
407 (2008), with Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407
(2008) (No. 07-343), 2007 WL 2688267 at *7.
131. Louisiana v. Kennedy, 957 So. 2d 757, 760 (La. 2007), rev'd 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
132. Id. at 793 (acknowledging that this was the first time the death penalty was as-
signed for this crime since the state revised its aggravated rape law). In handing down its
decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that the terrible nature of this crime distin-
guished it from other aggravated rape cases where the death penalty is not utilized or even
requested. Id.
133. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) (holding that Louisiana's statute
allowing for the execution of child-rapists who do not kill the victim violates the Eighth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
2011] 599
THE SCHOLAR
for that crime, and because evolving standards of decency in a civilized
society do not support application of the death penalty in that context. 1 34
The national consensus justification, though important, is not disposi-
tive of the Eighth Amendment inquiry,' 35 and is not relevant to the anal-
ysis in this Article. The analysis and justification relevant to this Article
is the Court's independent judgment of proportionality, including consid-
eration of evolving standards of decency.13 6
IV. PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PROPORTIONALITY IN
CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT
The concept of proportionality rests upon the notion that a criminal
should lose his rights to the extent he deprives another of his rights; Im-
manuel Kant calls it the "Principle of Equality."' This principle re-
quires justice to remain in balance, with the punishment carrying the
same weight as the crime for which it is imposed." 8 Kant writes that to
maintain the Principle of Equality, we must view the criminal as having
committed the crime against himself, and he must bear punishment ac-
cordingly."' This standard, which Kant calls the Right of Retaliation, is
the only standard by which a society can ensure that it performs justly.'4 0
Kant's point is not that letter-perfect equality between crime and pun-
ishment is always possible; for example, if imposing a monetary sanction
against a wealthy individual for slander, some additional social penalty
may be necessary to achieve the balance in light of the injury the slan-
134. Id. at 425-26, 438.
135. Id. at 438-39.
136. See id. at 420 (highlighting the Court's reasoning that capital punishment is not
appropriate in cases involving only the brutal sexual assault of a young child). The Court
declared that our society respects individual life and that execution must be accordingly
restrained. See id. at 434-35. It continued by stating that capital punishment is appropri-
ate only when the particular criminal act demands such a violent end. Id. at 437-38. The
Court then concluded that the death penalty is not applicable to a child-rapist so long as he
does not actually kill the child. Id. The dissent, on the other hand, claimed that average
American citizens agree that certain sexual assaults against children warrant capital pun-
ishment. Id. at 461 (Alito, J., dissenting).
137. IMMANUEL KANT, TiE PHui-osopiY or LAw: AN ExPOSITION OF THE FUNDA-
MENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGIrr 196 (W. Hastie trans.,
T. & T. Clark 1887) (1796) (claiming that the principle of equality is the standard by which
any theory of punishment must adhere to); see WILLIAM SEAGLE, MEN OF LAW: FROM
HAMMURAmI3 To Hote MS 27 (1947).
138. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE PiHILOsOPiiY OF LAw: AN ExposrriON oF Ti FUN-
DAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS TIlE SCIENCE oF Rirr 196 (W. Hastie,
trans., T. & T. Clark 1887) (1796).
139. Id.
140. See id. at 196-97.
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dered person has borne.14 1 Kant's point is, however, that society must
maintain balance in the effect of crime and punishment, and that imbal-
ance between crime and punishment is never just.1 4 2
Kant not only presents the Principle of Equality and Right of Retalia-
tion as a just system of invoking punishment for crimes, but also presents
it as the only just system. 14 3 Any other system of imposing punishment,
he writes, is too uncertain to achieve justice.144 The uncertainty in other
systems comes from "other considerations involved in them" 1 45 ; for ex-
ample, the subjectivity and inconsistency of a case-by-case system of
criminal punishment, the ineffectiveness of a system in which punishment
was too light, or the unfairness of a system in which punishment was too
severe.
With regard to the death penalty in particular, Kant writes that death is
the only just punishment for murder. 1 46 The negative implication, sup-
ported generally by the Principle of Equality and Right of Retaliation
theory, is that death is never a just punishment when the crime did not
involve the victim's death.14 7
V. PROPORTIONALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY FOR CHILD RAPE
The Court's decision that the death penalty is disproportionate to the
crime of child rape, though not stated in terms of Kant's Principle of
Equality and Right of Retaliation theory, is demonstrably consistent with
it nevertheless. Stated in terms of the Court's Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence, however, imposing the death penalty in this context does not
further the accepted goals of criminal punishment, and is inappropriate
based on the crime's severity.
The death penalty is the ultimate form of punishment, traditionally re-
served for only the most serious crimes involving the intentional and un-
lawful taking of another human life. The Supreme Court has previously
141. See id.
142. Id. at 197.
143. See IMMANUELi KANT, TiIE PILosoPHY OF LAw: AN ExrosrnON OF THI- FUN-
DAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUD3ENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RiGrr 196-97 (W. Hastie,
trans., T. & T. Clark 1887) (1796) (stating that these are the only acceptable theories in
exacting punishment, so that not only "the pointer of the Scale of Justice is made to incline
no more to the one side than the other," but in addition the court "can definitely assign
both the quality and the quantity of a just penalty").
144. Id.
145. See id. (opining that these other systems are inadequate when ascertaining justice
because of a lack of any "principle conformable to the sentence of pure and strict justice").
146. Id. at 198 (proclaiming that "whoever has committed Murder, must die") (em-
phasis in original)).
147. See id.
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ruled that capital punishment for the rape of an adult woman is dispro-
portionate and excessive, and therefore, unconstitutional.' 48 The Coker
Court concluded that proportionality is determined according to the na-
ture of the punishment compared to the crime committed and propor-
tionality is only one prong of the test to determine excessiveness. 1 4 9 The
Court has provided this guidance to the states: "punishment is 'excessive'
and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to accept-
able goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless
and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of pro-
portion to the severity of the crime." 150 Punishing an individual for a
violation of criminal law can be justified on a number of philosophical
grounds. "The two dominant rationales for a penal law are the desire for
retribution and the utilitarian desire to prevent or deter such violations
altogether."' 5 1
A. Acceptable Goals of Punishment
The penological goals of the death penalty-retribution and deter-
rence-must be served before executing child rapists. The Supreme
Court noted that, unless the death penalty serves the goal of retribution
or deterrence, it "is nothing more than the purposeless and needless im-
position of pain and suffering," which would render it an unconstitutional
punishment.15 2 For retribution to be a legitimate justification for the
death penalty, the Court stressed that it must be proportionate to the
defendant's culpability. 5
148. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. Michael O'Donovan, Comment, Criminalizing War: Toward A Justifiable Crime
of Aggression, 30 B.C. INr'I & Comp. L. Rev. 507, 524 (2007) (using the theories of re-
tributivism and utilitarianism to suggest a definition for crimes of aggression within the
jurisdiction of the World Criminal Court). While crimes of aggression were added to the
jurisdiction of the World Criminal Court in 1998, no agreed upon definition was estab-
lished; such crimes were left in a state of limbo until the 2009 session. Id. at 507.
O'Donovan suggests a definition that conforms to the two most common theoretical ru-
brics for defining criminal offenses, using the Kantian ideal of retribution for violating
identifiable social norms and the utilitarian ideal of prevention through the punishment of
offenses. See id. at 530. O'Donovan suggests that promulgation of a definable offense of
state aggression would effectively satisfy both philosophical standpoints by creating a defi-
nite norm which, when offended, triggers a retributive response, therefore sending the pre-
ventative message that states may no longer use aggression as an acceptable form of
statecraft. See id.
152. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
153. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800 (1982) (emphasizing the ancient require-
ment that the punishment fit the crime-specifically, the party's intent or "moral guilt").
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Retribution can involve either balancing the wrong done to the victim
or expressing the community's moral outrage toward the offense.154
However, the basic philosophy of retributivists (like Kant) is that justice
must be done, without regard to any other community concerns or
causes.15 5 Another way of describing retribution is that it emphasizes two
corresponding requirements: (1) society is under a duty to demand jus-
tice, and (2) justice requires that the punishment must be proportional to
the crime. 15 6
But imposing death upon the defendant when he did not cause a death
does not do justice, because the punishment is not proportional to the
crime; in essence, society takes more than an eye from the offender as
punishment for the eye he took from the victim. Further, it has been
reasoned that disproportionate penalties may make prosecutors and
sentencers reluctant to seek or impose penalties they see as unjust. "[I]f
unnecessarily harsh penalties are imposed, they may still undermine the
State's effort to deter more serious crimes because criminals may recog-
nize that once they have exposed themselves to a capital punishment, the
State has no further power to punish them.""5 ' Therefore, while some
may argue that death for child rape serves a retributive goal of punish-
ment, society does not do justice by imposing a punishment that is more
severe than, and thus disproportionate to, the crime committed.
The Kennedy majority recognized that Kennedy's victim endured such
terrible suffering at such a young age that she has lost her innocence and
that her life will never be the same.' That is undoubtedly true, but it is
not the same as losing her life. To sentence Patrick Kennedy to death for
taking away innocence and changing a life puts the scales of justice out of
proportion. 159 It puts too much weight on the punishment, given the na-
ture of the crime.
154. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).
155. IMMANUEL KAN-r, TIlE PiiLLosOPiY OF LAw: AN ExPosrnION oi "rii FuNDA-
MENTAL PRINCwILES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE oF Rioirr 198 (W. Hastie, trans.,
T. & T. Clark 1887) (1796) (adhering to the resoluteness of ensuring punishment is carried
out to those who deserve it). This is clear because:
Even if a Civil Society resolved to dissolve itself . . . the last Murderer lying in the
prison ought to be executed before the resolution was carried out. This ought to be
done in order that every one may realize the desert of his deeds, and that bloodguilti-
ness may not remain upon the people; for otherwise they might all be regarded as
participators in the murder as a public violation of Justice.
Id.
156. Kent Greenawalt, Commentary, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
343, 347-48 (1983).
157. State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 651 (Utah 1997).
158. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 435-36 (2008).
159. Id.
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Urging imposition of the death penalty for Patrick Kennedy, and those
similarly situated, equates the rape survivor's suffering with death.
Under Kant's Principle of Equality and Right of Retaliation theory, such
a view considers the survivor's life over. Treating her as dead discounts
the rest of her life. Although the Kennedy dissent and other critics of the
majority opinion accurately point out the severe and long-reaching effects
of such an experience, 6 o the profundity and duration of the crime's ef-
fects do not justify a disproportionate penalty.
The majority's critics do not account for the support systems and time
available to the survivor, along with her own strength, that could help her
lead a satisfying and productive life. To say that her life ended after the
rape (in Patrick Kennedy's case, when the survivor was eight-years-old) is
to say that the survivor cannot and should not expect to lead a worth-
while life. Not to say that we should neglect the deep and lasting effect
that a crime of this nature will have on the survivor, but this argument
goes further by taking away the possibility of life beyond the tragedy.
Utilitarians hold a different point of view regarding punishment than
do retributivists. The utilitarian position states that the justification for
punishment "lies in the useful purpose that punishment serves.",16  Jer-
emy Bentham theorized that individuals determine the actions they take
upon whether such actions result in pain or pleasure and the primary goal
of society is to maximize the total happiness of the community.1 6 2 In
other words, punishment imposed upon criminals must serve the "happi-
ness" of society, and the most useful way to promote society's happiness
is to deter future crime. Therefore, the question that must be answered is
whether executing the child rapist will enhance the community's happi-
ness, justice, or wealth by deterring similar acts in the future. Because it
takes many years, and often decades, to carry out,' 6 the death penalty
160. Id. at 466-67 (Alito, J., dissenting); Luke Fraser, Note, Supreme Court Finds An
Inexact Consensus to Spare Child Rapists: A Critical Examination of Kennedy v. Louisiana,
47 Hous. L. Riiv. 215, 238-40 (2010) (criticizing the Supreme Court's use of an antiquated
view of the effects of rape on the life of the victim in its decision). Fraser argues that,
instead of focusing on data and precedent, the Court should have paid more attention to
the "broader attitude of society towards child rapists." Luke Fraser, Note, Supreme Court
Finds An Inexact Consensus to Spare Child Rapists: A Critical Examination of Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 47 Hous. L. REv. 215, 238 (2010). The author suggested the use of public opin-
ion polls, legislative action on similar crimes, and found tougher sentiment towards child
rapists. Id.
161. Kent Greenawalt, Commentary, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
343, 347 (1983).
162. JEREMY BiENIT1IAM, AN INt-RODUCriON TO 'TiiE PRiNCrtES OF MORALS AND
LiEGISLATION 1-2 (Neill H. Alford et al. eds., 1986) (outlining Bentham's theory of Utility).
163. See, e.g., Free v. Peters, 50 F.3d 1362,1362 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1034 (1995); McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1493,1494 (9th Cir. 1995) (adopting the reasoning of
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has only a small deterrent effect, if any at all. Nevertheless, it is unlikely
that the child rapist will consider the potential for death as a punishment
before raping his child victim. Instead, the reality of the death penalty
may only be realized after the rape has occurred and, then, it will likely
only encourage the offender to rob his victim of his or her life in order to
preserve his chances of saving his own. 164
B. Severity of the Crime and Seriousness of the Offense
When evaluating the severity of the crime and the seriousness of the
offense, the Supreme Court has advised the lower courts to determine
proportionality by weighing three factors, which are consistent with the
retributivist position: (1) the severity of the penalty;165 (2) the gravity of
the offense;1 6 6 and (3) the blameworthiness of the defendant.167 Death is
the most severe of all punishments. It is irreversible. Only if the gravity
of the rape-a crime that harms both the victim and society-and the
blameworthiness of the rapist outweigh the severity of death is the death
penalty justified.
The number of children who are abused or raped each year is stagger-
ing, but appears to have declined from 1993.168 "Nearly two-thirds of all
Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473, 1492 (9th Cir.1990)) (holding Richmond's sixteen-year
death row incarceration during his appeals process did not violate the Constitution);
Thompson v. State, 3 So.3d 1237, 1238 (Fla. 2009) (denying defendant's claim that his
thirty-one year stay on the death row violated the Eighth Amendment); Booker v. State,
969 So.2d 186, 200 (Fla. 2007) (holding defendant's thirty-year incarceration on death row
does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
164. Meryl P. Diamond, Note, Assessing the Constitutionality of Capital Child Rape
Statutes, 73 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 1159, 1186-87 (1999); see also Dan M. Kahan, Between
Economics and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2477, 2490
(1997) (arguing that even life imprisonment as a penalty for rape is a sentence that will
incentivize the rapist to kill his victim).
165. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (finding relevance
in the death penalty being "a punishment different from all other sanctions in kind rather
than degree" (citation omitted)).
166. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598-99 (1977) (comparing the injury and the
moral depravity of rape with the injury and moral depravity resulting from the unjustified
taking of a human life).
167. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (requiring an individual consid-
eration of each particular defendant's culpability). When the death penalty can potentially
be imposed, individualized consideration is a constitutional requirement. Id.
168. ANDREA J. SEDLAK ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALT I & HUMAN SERVS., FOURTH
NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHIL D ABUSE AND NEGLECr (NIS-4): REPORT TO CON-
GRESS, ExFCUIVE SUMMARY 6 (2010), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/oprel
abuse neglect/natl incid/nis4_report exec summ.pdfjan2010.pdf (showing a marked de-
crease in child sexual abuse).
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forcible rapes occurred during childhood and adolescence;"16 9 the Na-
tional Center on Child Abuse estimates more than 135,000 cases of child
sexual abuse occurred between 2005 and 2006.170 Yale Glazer acknowl-
edged that "[1]ong-term follow-up studies with child sexual abuse victims
convinced researchers that sexual abuse was 'grossly intrusive in the lives
of children and is harmful to their normal psychological, emotional, and
sexual development in ways which no just or humane society can toler-
ate.' 17 1 She also noted that while "it is 'well known that child sexual
abuse leaves lasting scars that often carry from [one] generation to the
next,' the extent of the injuries is 'often incapable of precise determina-
tion.'" 1 72 Glazer elaborates: "[g]uilt, poor self-esteem, feelings of inferi-
ority, increased suicide attempts, and self-destructive behaviors also
accompany incidents of rape and child abuse." 3 Rape is undoubtedly
traumatic for a child, but it also has a devastating effect on society.
The threat of rape causes fear to pervade society. Glazer asserts "[t]he
fear of rape is extremely high among women; women between ages
nineteen to thirty-five fear being raped almost twice as much as being
murdered.""' Society at large also experiences many problems because
of rape. "A strong correlation has also been discovered between child
sexual abuse and interpersonal problems, delinquency, substance abuse,
and adult psychiatric illness.",17  Furthermore, studies have revealed "a
correlation exists between child sexual abuse, child physical abuse, and
victim-turned sex offenders."1 76 Finally, it can be expected that rape dis-
rupts the family unit when, as in a majority of cases, the sexual abuse is
169. Donald Dripps et al., Men, Women and Rape, 63 FORDIAM L. REv. 125, 136
(1994) (footnote omitted).
170. ANDREA J. SEDLAK ET AL., U.S. DEPr OFw HEALTh & HUMAN SE-Rvs., FOURTHI
NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHIHD ABUSE AND NEGIE17CT (NIS-4): REPORT TO CON-
GRESS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 (2010).
171. Yale Glazer, Child Rapists Beware! The Death Penalty and Louisiana's Amended
Aggravated Rape Statute, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 79, 87 (1997) (quoting CiiRISTOPHER BAGLEY
& KATHLEEN KING, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: THE SEARCH FOR HEALING 2 (1990)) (advo-
cating for imposition of the death penalty in instances of rape of a child under the age of
twelve).
172. Id. (quoting State v. Brown, 660 So. 2d 123, 125 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (per
curiam)) (indicating behavioral problems that result from rape continue after the physical
damage has subsided).
173. Id. at 88; see CHRISTOPHER BAGLEY & KATHLEEN KING, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE:
TiH SEARCH FOR HEALING 2 (1990).
174. Yale Glazer, Child Rapists Beware! The Death Penalty and Louisiana's Amended
Aggravated Rape Statute, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 79, 89 (1997).
175. Id.
176. Id.
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inflicted upon the child by a close friend or family member.'7 7 "In in-
tramarital sexual abuse cases, families are often torn apart as a result of
the sexual abuse of a child," and consequently, many social problems fol-
low after such a traumatic destruction of the family unit.' 7 8
Despite the physical, emotional, and psychological trauma suffered by
victims of child rape, death is not a proportionate punishment. Rape is
certainly a severe crime that causes a great degree of harm; the Coker
Court noted that "[r]ape is very often accompanied by physical injury to
the female and can also inflict mental and psychological damage. Be-
cause it undermines the community's sense of security, there is public
injury as well."17 9 The damage child rape inflicts on person and society is
at least as great as that inflicted by rape generally, and arguably greater.
However, despite the damage caused by rape, the Coker Court was clear
in its holding that only the taking of a life is eligible for the ultimate,
irreversible punishment of death.so By the same token, although the
damage child rape causes may be greater than that seen with rape gener-
ally, the harm is still not an ultimate, irreversible harm. Kant's Principle
of Equality and Right of Retaliation theory would, therefore, not support
imposition of the death penalty because the punishment would be out of
balance with the crime.' 8 '
VI. EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY?
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote "[t]he first requirement of a
sound body of law is, that it should correspond with the actual feelings
and demands of the community, whether right or wrong."' 8 2 Perhaps this
notion had some influence on the Trop Court when it decided that pun-
ishment under the Eighth Amendment must conform to "evolving stan-
dards of decency."" In Kennedy, the holding rested, in large part, upon
the same premises articulated in Trop1 " and Coker,185 not solely on the
177. See Victor 1. Vieth, Unto the Third Generation: A Call to End Child Abuse in the
United States Within 120 Years (Revised and Expanded), 28 HAMINE J. Pun. L. & Poi'y
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 53-55 (2006).
178. Yale Glazer, Child Rapists Beware! The Death Penalty and Louisiana's Amended
Aggravated Rape Statute, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 79, 89 (1997).
179. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-98 (1977) (footnote omitted).
180. See id. at 598.
181. IMMANUiL KANT, TIE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw: AN Exi~osmoN 0o1 FuNDA-
MENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 198 (W. Hastie, trans.,
T. & T. Clark 1887) (1796).
182. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., TiHE COMMON LAw 41 (1881).
183. Trop v. Dulies, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
184. See id. at 101 (recognizing that the Court's determination as to the constitutional-
ity of a punishment under Eight Amendment analysis is informed by "evolving standards
of decency").
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"national consensus" basis, as argued by critics.1 86 First, the Court held
that "there is a social consensus against the death penalty for the crime of
child rape;" and, second, the Court held the penalty was disproportionate
based on the Court's own independent judgment.18' To determine this
second prong, the Court considered whether the punishment at issue
comported with "evolving standards of decency.",1 8
Under the evolving standards of decency analysis, unconstitutional
practices do not generally become constitutional as time progresses, but
currently constitutional practices may approach unconstitutionality as so-
ciety's standards of decency evolve.' 8 9 Contemporary community senti-
ment and decency should not necessarily dictate punishment and the
Court must tread lightly when looking to such standards when it holds life
in its hands.
Following the Kantian notions of justice, the Kennedy Court, like the
Coker Court, seemed to acknowledge that community sentiment can be
fleeting, and we should be extremely hesitant to let such sentiment con-
tribute to an irreversible, permanent punishment.' 90 Further, we should
not allow for a human life to be taken simply as a salve for a community's
anger."' Individuals should be punished based on the crimes they actu-
ally commit-not on the crimes as the public sees them or on the outrage
that the public may justifiably express at the result of the crime.' 9 2
"[T]he sentence of the law is to the moral sentiment of the public in rela-
185. Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (noting that evolving standards of decency-referred to as
"recent events," such as legislative acts and jury sentences-strongly confirmed the Court's
own independent judgment with regard to proportionality).
186. See generally Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
187. Id. at 433, 438-39.
188. Id. at 433, 419-21.
189. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
(No. 00-8452), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argu-
ment-transcripts/00-8452.pdf (noting that the Eighth Amendment is a "one-way ratchet").
For instance, once society has come to a consensus that execution of mentally disabled
persons is unconstitutional, there can never be new legislation that sanctions the execution
of mentally disabled individuals. Id. at 9.
190. See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420.
191. See IMMANUUI KANT, THE1 PHILOSOPHY OF LAw: AN ExrosnIoN OF TIE FUN-
DAMENT'AL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGIrr 194-98 (W. Hastie
trans., T. & T. Clark 1887) (1796); see also Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 433, 420 (noting the risks
associated with retributive justice: "When the law punishes by death, it risks its own sud-
den descent into brutality.").
192. IMMANueL KANT, TiHE_ PIIILOSOIIY oi- LAw: AN ExPosInION OF THE FUNDA-
MENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIourr 194-98 (W. Hastie
trans., T. & T. Clark 1887) (1796). "Juridical punishment can never be administered
merely as a means for promoting another good either with regard to the criminal himself
or to civil society ..... Id. Immanuel Kant advocated for the principle that a human being
should never be used to satisfy someone else's purpose. See id.
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tion to any offen[se] what a seal is to hot wax. It converts into a perma-
nent final judgment what might otherwise be a transient sentiment."1 9 3
There is also a danger of randomness associated with applying the
death penalty based upon community and victim judgments. Some vic-
tims' families and communities may oppose the death penalty or may be
more willing to accept the quick finality of a defendant's guilty plea.
Other families and communities, however, may insist that prosecutors go
to trial and pursue the death penalty at all costs. Some defendants, will-
ing to enter a plea agreement with the state, will be punished less severely
than those exercising their constitutional right to a trial by a jury of their
peers. As a result, one defendant may receive life in prison while another
is executed after committing a virtually identical, perhaps even more bru-
tal, crime.
Understandably, society is generally outraged when a child is sexually
violated by an adult, and even more so, disgusted when it is discovered
that the adult is a father, mother, or trusted family member or friend.
However, despite the outrage and disgust over such crimes, a decent and
mature society must recognize that utilizing capital punishment for such
crimes does not necessarily deter offenders from committing them or pro-
tect children from being victimized. Instead, it may place children in
greater danger, discourage them from reporting their victimization, sub-
ject them to additional emotional trauma, and strain state resources that
could be used in other, more beneficial, ways.1 9 4
A. Capital Child Rape Statutes Do Not Protect Child Victims From
Possible Death at the Hand of the Rapist
Our country's attention is constantly drawn to the sexual abuse of chil-
dren; the most heinous and conscience-shocking cases are broadcast by
the media to a nationwide audience. Some states have reacted by enact-
ing capital child rape statutes to protect children from sexual predators.
The Louisiana Supreme Court distinguished capital punishment for the
rape of a child from the rape of an adult woman, possibly to bypass the
Supreme Court's Coker decision, by finding that the legislature passed
the statute under the notion that "rape becomes much more detestable
when the victim is a child .. . . [s]ince children cannot protect themselves,
193. JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
80-82 (1883), reprinted in JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIAIS ON CRIMINAL LAW,
41 (3d ed. 2003).
194. See generally Victor I. Vieth, Unto the Third Generation: A Call to End Child
Abuse in the United States Within 120 Years (Revised and Expanded), 28 HAMLINE J. PUB.
L. & Pot'Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1 (2006) (detailing a plan to "end child abuse in the United
States within three generations").
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the State is given the responsibility to protect them."'1 5 Carl Babin, a
Louisiana criminal defense attorney, testified before the House of Repre-
sentatives of the Louisiana State Legislature on behalf of the Louisiana
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and tried to counter this posi-
tion before the law passed.' 96 He attempted to explain to the Committee
that a person committing a rape, when exposed to the potential punish-
ment of death, will have no incentive not to kill his victim, if the death
penalty awaits him either way.' 9 7 Under capital child rape statutes, a rap-
ist who murders his victim, after raping the victim, is eligible for no
greater punishment than if he only rapes the victim and allows him or her
to survive the crime. If death is the ultimate punishment, then it seems
there is no incentive for child rapists subject to the death penalty to elimi-
nate the best, if not the only, witness to the crime.' Although there is
no way to measure whether a more severe penalty creates an incentive
for rapists to murder their victims in an attempt to reduce the likelihood
of being caught, the notion is supported by analogous penalties.
For instance, it is possible to draw a comparison between the potential
for violence of those offenders facing mandatory life imprisonment under
California's three strikes laws'99 and the potential for rapists to murder
their victims if subject to death.2" The "three strikes" laws are designed
to enhance the penalty for a third-time felony offender and have created
the potential for "violent attacks on police officers and potential wit-
nesses by a criminal class that would otherwise be unlikely to commit acts
of violence." 2 0 1 In addition, there is fear "that a person facing a
mandatory life sentence will be far more likely to resist arrest, to kill wit-
nesses or to attempt a prison escape." 2 0 2 Accordingly, if individuals with
195. State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1066-67 (La. 1996).
196. Committee Notes, Administration of Criminal Justice, Debate on House Bill 55,
April 19, 1995, Louisiana State Legislature.
197. Id.
198. "The rapist may feel he is better off killing the child, therefore ridding himself of
the prime witness against him and perhaps escaping detection as the perpetrator of the
crime." Meryl P. Diamond, Note, Assessing the Constitutionality of Capital Child Rape
Statutes, 73 ST. JoHN's L. Rev. 1159, 1186 (1999); see also Dan M. Kahan, Between Eco-
nomics and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence, 95 MicH. L. Riv. 2477, 2490 (1997)
(arguing that even life imprisonment as a penalty for rape is a sentence that will incentivize
the rapist to kill his victim).
199. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 2007).
200. Nkechi Taifa, Symposium, "Three-Strikes-and-You're-Out"-Mandatory Life Im-
prisonment for Third Time Felonies, 20 U. DAYTON L. REv. 717, 724 (1995).
201. Keith C. Owens, Comment, California's "Three Strikes" Debacle: A Volatile Mix-
ture of Fear, Vengeance, and Demagoguery Will Unravel the Criminal Justice System and
Bring California to Its Knees, 25 Sw. U. L. REv. 129, 157 (1995) (footnote omitted).
202. Nkechi Taifa, "Three-Strikes-and-You're-Out"-Mandatory Life Imprisonment
for Third Time Felonies, 20 U. DAYroN L. RE'v. 717, 724 (1995).
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two felony convictions are willing to resist arrest, fire shots at police, and
kill witnesses, it can also be logically argued that a child rapist in Louisi-
ana would consider killing the victim to avoid the possibility of facing the
death penalty, with a witness to corroborate the attack.
Nevertheless, it could be argued child rapists would not murder or seri-
ously injure a child since a majority of these offenses are perpetrated by
family members or close friends.20 ' Still, scholars have theorized the pos-
sibility that perpetrators of rape against children have incentive to mur-
der their victims, and one research study has measured that
approximately 10% of child sexual assault has resulted in the murder of
the youth victim.2 04 Statistically it seems that many rapists have no reser-
vations about killing their child victim in the present environment. If the
Supreme Court allows capital punishment for child rape, it will be effec-
tively increasing the rapist's incentive to kill.
B. Capital Punishment May Result in an Increased Unwillingness of
Child Victims to Report the Crime(s)
Family members or friends are often the perpetrators of sexual abuse
among children.20 5 Reports show that family members or acquaintances
and friends accounted for a significant majority of child rape.2 06 The
crimes are typically under-reported because victims and innocent family
members are concerned about the legal, financial, and emotional conse-
quences of coming forward. 207 "A common dynamic of incestuous fami-
lies is [the] child victims' hesitancy to divulge the sexual abuse because of
their fears of 'dire consequences to themselves, the abuser or the rest of
the family should they disclose the abuse."' 20 8 "The possibility of the
death sentence 'create[s] an intolerable dilemma for the many children
raped by family members or close family friends-to report the crime and
203. See Robert T. Mertens, Child Sexual Abuse in California: Legislative and Judicial
Responses, 15 GODEN GATE U. L. REv. 437, 449 (1985) (arguing that because of personal
relationships with their victim, the abuser will draw a line between rape and murder that he
will not cross).
204. LAWRENCET A. GREENFELD, BUREAU OF JUST1CE STATISTICS, SEX OFFENSES AND3
OFFENDERS: AN ANAL ysis oi, DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL AssAucr vi (Feb. 1997).
205. Robert T. Mertens, Child Sexual Abuse in California: Legislative and Judicial
Responses, 15 GODoN GATE U. L. REv. 437, 441 (1985).
206. CILo WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, Cinto ABUSE AND NEGLEcT FA-
TALEITES: STATISTICS AND INTERVENTIONS (2010), http://www/childwelfare.gov/pubs/fact-
sheets/fatality.cfm#perps ("In 2008, parents, acting alone or with another person, were
responsible for 71.0 percent of child abuse or neglect fatalities.").
207. Charles R. Petrof, Protecting the Anonymity of Child Sexual Assault Victims, 40
WAYNE L. REv. 1677, 1691 (1994).
208. DOUGLASS J. BFSHIAROV, RECOGNIZING CHILD AI3USE: A GUIDE FOR THE' CON-
CERNED 18 (1990).
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face the possibility that Daddy or uncle or brother will be put to death, or
to continue to endure their pain in silence."' 2 09 In the amicus brief sub-
mitted to the Kennedy court, it was noted that a dilemma is also created
for the mother of the abused child, "too many [of whom] already turn a
blind eye to the horrifying reality of their daughters being raped because
of the potential consequences to their husbands, their daughters, and
their families." 2 1 0 It is entirely possible the child rapist can use his poten-
tial death sentence to frighten the child and keep him or her from report-
ing the rape to another adult. This leads to the conclusion that
sanctioning use of the death penalty for the rape of a child will further
diminish the child's willingness to report the rape and allow the child rap-
ist to remain at-large and free to rape again. Accordingly, in a society
where many children are already reluctant to reveal sexual abuse,21 par
ticularly if the abuse involves an ongoing relationship with family mem-
bers, the death penalty for the rape of a child should not be permitted
because the potential for further discouragement of reporting subjects
these children to continuous harm and exploitation.
C. Exposing the Child to a Capital Trial May Also Discourage
Reporting and Prevent the Healing Process From Progressing
Another issue that must be considered is that, not only has the child-
victim suffered the physical and psychological trauma of the rape itself,
but the child must endure the subsequent trial.2 12 Sexual abuse cases are
some of the most difficult cases to try and often, the child who has been
209. Yale Glazer, Child Rapists Beware! The Death Penalty and Louisiana's Amended
Aggravated Rape Statute, 25 AM. J. CRiM. L. 79, 112 (1997) (footnote omitted).
210. Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Soc. Workers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner at 11, Kennedy v. State of Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (No. 07-343) (citing works
that list incentives to not report the abuse). Mothers of abuse victims may also fear possi-
ble destitution, family disintegration, and/or the possibility of increased violence, and con-
sequently not disclose the abuse. Id.
211. The actual number of abused children is unknown because countless cases of
child abuse go unreported. See BARBARA TATEM KELLEY ET AL., U.S. Daiwr OF Jus-
TICE-OFFICE OF JUV. JUST. AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLE-
TIN: IN THE WAKE OF CHILDHOOD MALTREATMENT 1 (1997) (explaining the results of a
research study that focused on the correlation between childhood maltreatment and ado-
lescent delinquency).
212. See Charles R. Petrof, Protecting the Anonymity of Child Sexual Assault Victims,
40 WAYNE L. Ruv. 1677, 1687 (1994) (arguing that preserving the "anonymity of child
sexual assault victims" is a compelling state interest that helps the child victim recover and
encourages the child victim's testimony). One study found sexually assaulted child victims
who testify face a protracted healing period compared to child victims who did not testify.
Id. Because children frequently testify in sexual assault cases, such situations demand spe-
cial attention. Id. Furthermore, because of the sensitive situation, social reactions upon
discovery of the child's victimization can have substantial effects on the psychological
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raped is the prosecution's key witness.2 13 In sexual abuse and child rape
trials, the child victim who testifies is often attacked by the defense, ac-
cused of fabricating their story of abuse.2 14 It can be argued that because
these capital rape statutes involve the death penalty, the child's trauma
from the assault is exacerbated by the notion that his or her testimony
could result in the death of the person who harmed him or her. Death
penalty trials are often long and difficult and, consequently, if children
become involved in the judicial process, the horrible experience they
have gone through will become even more psychologically trauma-
tizing.21 5 Subjecting a child to a capital trial seemingly precludes a less
complicated healing process for the child and would subject the child to
more pain. As important as it is to protect children from child rapists,
it is equally important to protect them from any further emotional
trauma.
It is questionable whether allowing the death penalty for child rape
cases will actually protect the children. As discussed above, the enormity
of death penalty litigation is an ordeal that could further traumatize al-
ready emotionally fragile child victims. Further, if the rapist does not kill
the child to protect himself from being caught or convicted, those perpe-
trators who are friends or relatives of the victim may use the possibility of
death to dissuade the children from reporting sexual abuse thereby sub-
jecting the child to continued abuse. The Supreme Court must carefully
consider of all of these issues before allowing states to "protect" children
with capital rape legislation.
trauma. Id. For example, indifference, a generally benign reception to a situation, can
result in further psychological trauma when the child has been sexually abused. Id.
213. Robert T. Mertens, Child Sexual Abuse in California: Legislative and Judicial
Responses, 15 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 437 (1985).
214. See Debra Whitcomb et al., The Emotional Effects of Testifying on Sexually
Abused Children, Nat'l Inst. of Justice: Research in Brief (April 1994) (discussing three
studies that focused on the effects on sexually abused children testifying at trial).
215. G. Russell Nuce, Comment, Child Sexual Abuse: A New Decade for Protection of
Our Children?, 39 EMoRY L.J. 581, 608 (1990). Testifying against a family member can be
traumatic to the victim and has been referred to as "system-induced trauma." Id. Con-
versely, there are people who believe confronting their abuser will be "cathartic" for the
victim and will provide them the opportunity to assist in the prosecution of their abuser.
Id. at 609.
216. Id. "Of those victims who testified, 73% were found to have significant behav-
ioral problems after their exposure to the criminal justice system." Id. (footnote omitted).
As the mother of a seven-year-old child who was kidnapped and murdered said, "'[t]he
death penalty causes family members more pain than other sentences. The continuous
sequence of courtroom scenes inherent in death penalty cases only serve to keep emotional
wounds raw and in pain for years." JESSE JACKSON & JESSE JACKSON, JR., LEGAL LYNCH-
ING: RACE, INJUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 57-58 (1996).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Kennedy Court has reinforced the principle that "[t]he [Eighth]
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society."' The Court em-
ployed its independent judgment undergirded by its prior decisions in
Trop and Coker to reach its holding in Kennedy. Far from being arbitrary
as critics argue, the Court's holding in Kennedy rests on the same founda-
tions of freedom from torture and other cruel and excessive punishments
which have always informed our Eight Amendment jurisprudence. It is
clear from the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that
the death penalty, as applied to child rapists, is excessive and, while it
may serve a retributive function, it will not likely deter child rapists and
may even encourage them to kill their victims to conceal their acts. Fur-
ther, this Article has illustrated that a decent and maturing society cannot
support capital child rape sentencing schemes because of the potential
harm to children such sentencing schemes could cause. The potential for
the death penalty being imposed upon the sexual predator may result in
children becoming more reluctant to report sexual assaults and place
them in danger of being continuing victims of the predator. Therefore,
the Supreme Court's decision in Kennedy served two societal goals. It
preserved the status quo which prohibited the use of disproportionate
punishment on wrongdoers. And, more importantly, it prohibited the im-
position of the death penalty upon child rapists in order to better protect
the safety and welfare of our children.
217. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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